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WHAT’S IN A NAME? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Plenty. This paper analyzes two broad questions: Does your first name matter? And how did you 
get your first name anyway? Using data from the National Opinion Research Centers (NORC’s) 
General Social Survey, including access to respondents first names from the 1994 and 2002 
surveys, we extract the important “first name features” (FNF), e.g. popularity, number of 
syllables, phonetic features, Scrabble score, “blackness” (i.e. the fraction of people with that 
name who are black), etc ... We then explore whether these first name features are useful 
explanatory factors of a respondent’s exogenous background factors (sex, race, parents’ 
education, etc...) and lifetime outcomes (e.g. financial status, occupational prestige, perceived 
social class, education, happiness, and whether they became a parent before 25). We find that 
first name features on their own do have significant predictive power for a number of these 
lifetime outcomes, even after controlling for a myriad of exogenous background factors. We find 
evidence that first name features are independent predictors of lifetime outcomes that are likely 
related to labor productivity such as education, happiness and early fertility. Importantly, 
however, we also find evidence based on the differential impacts of gender and race on the 
blackness of a name and its popularity that suggest that discrimination may also be a factor. 
JEL classification: D1, J1, J7. 
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That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.
William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet.
So I give ya that name and I said goodbye
I knew you’d have to get tough or die
And it’s that name that helped to make you strong
Johnny Cash (1969), A Boy Named Sue.
1 Introduction
Expectant parents lie awake at night, consult books, and some even hire a consultant to choose
their new child’s name. Is it similar to the process that manufacturers undertake when branding
a new product? Viagara pretty much speaks for itself, but to what extent does Gregory, Saku or
even Jamaal convey information and/or meaning. Our study explores two main questions. First,
does a person’s name convey information about their background? Second, does a person’s name
have an impact on the person’s long run economic outcomes, such as income, education, fertility,
social standing, happiness or prestige?
Recently economists have turned to the analysis and impact of an individuals ﬁrst name.1
The emphasis of this analysis has been on the impact of having an African American Name. More
formally, these studies contrast the outcomes of an individual having a name that signal high
probability of being black with outcomes individual that has a name that signals a high probability
of being white. In our dataset, this would mean comparing the outcomes of otherwise similar
individuals with a name like Mark (exclusively a white name in our data) with Marcus (exclusively
a black name in our data) or comparing Alice (white name) with Tanisha (black name).
1Names have been for a longer period a topic of research for other social scientist and linguistics. Sociologist
Stanley Lieberson, in work with co-authors, has considered many of the question we list in our opening paragraph,
e.g. Lieberson & Bell (1992), Lieberson & Kelly (1995) and Lieberson (2000). They provide an extended descriptive
discussion on what inﬂuences parent’s choice of ﬁrst names for their children and extensively document static and
dynamic features of ﬁrst-name distributions in the US across time. While it does not do full justice to their rich
analysis, it could be said that their framework is mostly concentrated around the question on what inﬂuences pure
parental preference for ﬁrst names as opposed to the more structural economic mechanisms considered here.
1In a compelling study, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) undertake a carefully controlled
experimental study on the extent to which an African American ﬁrst name aﬀects ones job prospects.
Constructing a set of synthetic resumes that diﬀer based on whether the applicant has an African
American name,2 the researchers send these resumes to actual job openings listed in the newspapers
of a number of major cities. Importantly, they ﬁnd that in order to receive one job interview, a
resume with a black name needs to be sent to 15 openings. In contrast, to receive one job open-
ing, a resume with a white name needs to be sent to only 10 openings. Furthermore, by using
auxiliary information from birth certiﬁcates from Massachusetts that also list mother’s education
Bertrand and Mullainathan construct measures of expected maternal education level for each name
in their sample. Their results imply that it is the racial information conveyed in the name and not
the parental background factor signaled by the name (parental education) that potential employ-
ers are using as the basis to select between resumes.3 They conclude that this shows that racial
discrimination is pervasive in the job market.
A similar set of issues is addressed in another recent study by Fryer and Levitt (2003). They
make two main contributions to our understanding of the economic role of ﬁrst names. First, they
outline four approaches to the economic analysis of ﬁrst names: namely, ignorance, price theory
model, a signalling model, and an identity model. The ﬁrst model speaks for itself: it assumes that
parents ignore or are unaware of any consequences of their child’s ﬁrst name. The price model,
assumes that parents choose their child’s name to maximize their expected utility. If indeed, an
individual of social group A is more likely to be in society dominated by group A (B) individuals,
then their parents will choose names that are more in keeping with names from group A (B), as such
a choice is likely to increase their child’s economic opportunities. The signaling model, suggests
that parents signal their type (i.e. are they a member of group A or B) by choosing names that
are consistent with the features of those in type A or B. In doing so, individuals can learn about
the parent’s type through their choice of child’s name. Finally, the identity model attempt to
address the presumed shortcoming of the signaling model: namely, that sending signals is generally
assumed to be costly. However, if ethnic names are not costly, perhaps the economic model that
2The authors do vary the applicants level of expertise.
3Bertrand and Mullainathan also found little evidence that names as a social background marker have an eﬀect
on the probability that a resume leads to a callback from a potential employer.
2needs to be adopted should allow for a positive beneﬁt to ethnic names. Such an approach is used
by Akerloﬀ and Kranton (2000). They provide a model and set of examples whereby an individual
takes on actions that may even appear to be detrimental, in order to improve their sense of self
as a member of an identiﬁed group. Applied to name choice situation, their model is closer to the
framework of Lieberson and coauthors, since the choice of the name is driven by a direct argument
of utility function (identity) and not by a indirect eﬀect through the outcomes of social or market
interactions like in the models of Fryer and Levitt.
In addition to their contribution to understanding the economics of naming one’s children
they also provide an intriguing analysis of whether the blackness of a respondent’s name (that
is, the conditional probability that a respondent’s name is held by someone that is black) aﬀects
a respondent’s fertility outcomes. Using birth records from the State of California, Fryer and
Levitt (2003) primarily provide an analysis of the eﬀect of the blackness of a respondent’s name
on unwelcome birth outcomes – low birth weight babies, unmarried parents, lack of private health
insurance, and total children born. In general, they ﬁnd that the blackness of the mother’s name
is related to unwelcome birth outcomes.4 Using the broad time series of their data, however, Fryer
and Levitt can match a mother’s information to her own birth, and in doing so they demonstrate
that the blackness of a mother’s names is associated with her own parent’s outcomes (i.e. was she
born out of wedlock, was her own mother a teenager, ...). In particular they show that the blackness
of a woman’s name is related to the poor birth outcomes of her parents. They conclude from these
ﬁndings that since there is evidence that the blackness of a name reﬂects in part the individual’s
background that they grew up in, it is likely to be related to factors that could realistically aﬀect
their labor productivity. As such, they reconcile their work with Bertrand and Mullainathan by
noting that while a black name may get fewer interviews, interviewers are likely to be inferring
(and rightfully so) something about the individuals background and perhaps labor productivity.
Our study diﬀers from these studies in the following three important ways. First, rather than
focus on the issue of African American names, we explore broader linguistic features of names that
4Fryer and Levitt (2003) do provide a results where the birth mother’s and father’s educational attainments at
the time of birth, and where zip-code speciﬁc income data are the dependent variables. However, the vast majority
of their ﬁndings are focused on birth outcomes.
3may convey meaning and/or may bring out discrimination. For instance, women with diminutive
sounding names that end in an ‘ee’ sound, may also face glass walls and ceilings in their job market
prospects.5 Second, unlike the aforementioned studies that are limited in the literal outcomes they
can consider (i.e. interviews and early births), our use of the General Social Survey (GSS) allows us
to consider a broader set of economic outcomes. More speciﬁcally, we investigate the extent to which
a respondent’s ﬁrst name features aﬀect his or her years of formal education, self reported ﬁnancial
relative position as well as social class, to have a child before 25, and occupational prestige. Third,
because we have data for both men and women, we can examine the gender diﬀerences between
lifetime outcomes and ﬁrst name features. Together, our use of broader linguistic features of names
coupled with a more comprehensive set of lifetime outcomes for both male and female respondents
make our study an important contribution to the understanding of the role that ﬁrst names play
in our economic and social lives.
Our analysis produces three important empirical ﬁndings. First, there is a strong empirical
relationship between an individual’s ﬁrst name and their background. Second, there is a weaker
empirical relationship between an individual’s lifetime outcomes and their ﬁrst names. Taken
together, these ﬁrst two ﬁndings are consistent with those of Fryer and Levitt (2003) – names may
convey information about an individual’s labor market productivity.
However, our third empirical ﬁnding is that both non-black non-whites with ‘blacker’ names
as well as blacks with more popular (i.e. predominantly ‘whiter’) names have signiﬁcantly worse
ﬁnancial outcomes. This last piece of evidence can be interpreted in light of a subtle form of
discrimination: namely, while black names come with discrimination and identity costs and beneﬁts
for black individuals, non-black non-whites with ‘blacker’ names face the costs of such names though
not the beneﬁts. A similar identity/discrimination channel would also hold for blacks with more
popular (i.e. whiter) names. This ﬁnal point is consistent with Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2003)
ﬁnding of a link between ﬁrst names and discrimination, though it does not provide conclusive proof
of discrimination.
5Such a study may not in general be possible using other data sets. For example, the data in Lieberson and
Mikelson (1995) and Fryer and Levitt (2001) only have a ﬁxed number of the ﬁrst letters of the name, so that many
endings are not observable.
42 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis section is broken into three main parts. Sub-section 2.1 provides a description
of our data as well as the features we extract from an individual’s reported ﬁrst name. In sub-
sections 2.2 we provide the simple empirical regularities about ﬁrst name features. Finally, in
sub-section 2.3 we provide an empirical analysis of how ﬁrst name features aﬀect a respondent’s
lifetime outcomes.
2.1 The Data
In this section, we begin by describing the data employed in the paper. The GSS is an annual
survey which asks respondents speciﬁc questions about their ﬁnancial status, standard demographic
variables (e.g., age, education, etc...), family information and background, as well as many more
areas. The respondents are not re-interviewed across years so that that data are repeated cross
sections rather than a panel. In two years, 1994 and 2002, the respondents were asked their ﬁrst
names which was coded by the interviewers.6 There are a total number of just under six thousand
respondents who reported names in the 1994 and 2002 surveys. Summary statistics for the key
variables are reported in the Table 1, and a description of the variables we examine is presented in
the Data Appendix.
The key variable of interest for this study is the extraction of important ﬁrst name features
from a respondent’s name. The names data are recorded by interviewers and only clear keyboard
errors were ﬁxed, such as if the number ‘1’ was struck instead of an ‘l’ or if the word ‘respondent’
was recorded as the ﬁrst name. The ﬁrst name features we create are as follows. Following Fryer and
Levitt (2003), the Blackness index, BIND, is the probability of being black conditional on having
the name in our sample. This was calculated only for names that have at least two occurrences in
the sample.7 Again, as shown in their study, this variable is associated with poor outcomes for the
6This data was made available to us based on a joint understanding between the authors and the National Opinion
Research Center that the data would remain strictly conﬁdential.
7So as not to introduce correlation between our measured BIND index and the error term, the BIND is calculated
for each individual’s name omitting their own name observation in the calculation. To note, the results presented
5respondent’s birth outcomes as well as the one into which she was born.
In addition, we also allow for a rich set of more linguistically based features of ﬁrst names.
First, the popularity, POP, of a name was calculated as one minus the respondent’s name rank in
gender speciﬁc Social Security Administrations’ ‘Top 1,000 popularity list’ for the birth decade of
the individual divided by 1000.8 The series runs in ascending from 0 to 1, and has the value 0 if
the name does not appear on the list, and 1 if it has the top name, namely 1 − ((rank − 1)/1000).
To account for unusual spellings of the name, UNUSUAL-SP, is a dummy variable equal to one if
the name is spelled unusually, and zero otherwise. A name was determined to be unusually spelled
if multiple spellings were pronounced the same way (e.g. Jeﬀrey and Geoﬀrey), the more popular
name appeared at least four times, and the less popular spelling occurred half or fewer times as
the most popular spelling. SY LLABLES is the number of syllables in a name, coded by following
the rules of syllabication.9 Finally, NICKNAME is a dummy variable if the name was listed as a
nickname by Wallace (1992).
We also include a number of additional potentially important linguistic features of names
that have currently not been explored and yet may convey information to employers and/or reﬂect
aspects of an individual’s upbringing. The following dummy variables are deﬁned to be equal to
one if their criteria is met and zero otherwise: AH-END if the name ends with an ‘ah’ sound (e.g.
Laura), 0H-END if the name ends with an ‘oh’ sound (e.g. Mario), EE-END if the name ends
with an ‘ee’ sound (e.g. Brittany), VOW-BEG if the name begins with a vowel (e.g. Abigail), and
CON-END if the name ends with a consonant (e.g. Meredith). Finally, we adopt SCRABBLE
as a measure of name’s linguistic complexity. It is measured by the simple word score the name
would receive from the Scrabble, the popular board game. Taken together, these linguistic feature
below are very similar if this adjustment is not made. For unique names, the BIND is set equal to the probability that
the respondent is black, conditional on having a unique name. This treatment diﬀers from that in Fryer and Levitt
(2003), though the ﬁndings below do not depend on this data construction decision. Also note that given the few
number of Asians in the sample and that Hispanics are coded as white in the GSS, the black names index, BIND, is
very strongly negatively correlated with a similarly constructed white names index, and is also negatively correlated
with the Popularity of a name discussed below. See Fryer and Levitt (2003) for a discussion of other names indices.
8The Social Security Administration lists the top 1,000 names by decade and by gender on their website,
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/babynames/.
9For an example of the rules of syllabication see http://english.glendale.cc.ca.us/syllables.html. We also coded
the number of letters in a name but do not include it in our analysis as it is very highly correlated (approximately
0.9) with the number of syllables.
6provide a broader scope for discerning potential information that may be projected from and/or
onto a name.
Next, we now turn to a description of the six lifetime outcomes that we examine in this
study. Our measures of lifetime outcomes are a wide-ranging scope of economic and social standing
outcomes that have clear economic content and implications and which may be aﬀected by a
respondent’s ﬁrst name. First, FINRELA is the respondent’s household ﬁnancial income relative
to others. It is measured on a self reported increasing scale of 1 to 5.10 Second, OCCPREST is
the respondent’s occupational prestige score based on 1980 occupational classiﬁcations and income,
and it is on an increasing scale from 17 to 86. Third, we deﬁne CLASS to be the respondent’s
social class relative to others. It is measured on a self reported scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being lower
class, 2 being working class, 3 being middle class and 4 being upper class. Fourth, since Fryer and
Levitt point to the importance of birth outcomes as they related to their black names index, we
deﬁne CHB25 to be a dummy variable equal to 1 if an over-25 year old respondent reports having a
child before 25, and zero otherwise. This variable is deﬁned for both male and female respondents.
Our ﬁnal two measures of lifetime outcomes are happiness, measured on a an increasing scale of 1
(‘not too happy’), 2 (‘pretty happy’) or 3 (‘very happy’), and EDUC which is the number of years
of education that the respondent has obtained.11,12
Additional explanatory variables which we use to control for observable factors that can
systematically inﬂuence a respondent’s lifetime outcomes are the respondent’s age, AGE, labor
market experience, LMEX which is equal to AGE − EDUC − 5 and sex, MALE.13 We also have
additional information of a respondent’s background. For instance, we code the dummy variables
BLACK if the respondent lists this as their race and OTHER is for those who report a race other
10FINRELA is measured on a self reported scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being that your ﬁnancial status is well below the
mean, 2 being that it is below the mean, 3 being that it is about the mean, 4 being that it is above the mean, and 5
being that it is far above the mean. While the GSS does report family income for some years, it does not do so for
all years.
11The actual question is: “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days would you say that you
are:” very happy (3), pretty happy(2), or not too happy (1)? Note that the GSS codes happiness so that an increase
in the score makes one unhappy. To ease the presentation, we changed the order of the scale.
12We also experimented with measuring education by the highest degree obtained. They are not included as the
results were broadly similar.
13We also experimented with placing an upper bound on LMEX to account for retirement. Such a change does
not aﬀect the results presented below.
7than white or black.14 In addition, MAEDUC and PAEDUC are the number of years of the
respondent’s parent’s formal education. Also, if either of a respondent’s parents were born outside
of the U.S., then ABROAD is set equal to one, and is zero otherwise.15 Again, the details of the
data are provided in the Data Appendix as well as in Table 1.
2.2 Empirical Regularities
Table 1 provides a number of basic statistics for the main data of interest. In particular, we report
the mean, standard deviation, median, minimum, maximum and number of observations for each of
the 11 ﬁrst name features, FNF = {POPULATION, SYLLABLES, SCRABBLE, UNUSUAL-SP,
NICKNAME, AH-END, 0H-END, EE-END, VOW-BEG, CON-END, BIND}, our six measures
of lifetime outcomes, LO = {FINRELA, OCCPREST, CLASS, HAPPY, CHBF25, and EDUC },
and our nine exogenous background factors, EBF = {BLACK, OTHERRACE, MALE, YRBORN,
PAEDUC, MAEDUC, SIBS, ABROAD}.16 Both BLACK, OTHERRACE and MALE are of di-
rect interest as both gender and race are often important decipherable information from a name.
Approximately 14 percent of the sample are black, 44 percent are male and the average age is in
their mid 40’s.
14Unfortunately, in the GSS not all demographic questions are asked for both the respondent and his/her spouse.
15The results below are robust to separately including dummy variables for whether the respondent was born
abroad or just their parents were born abroad.
16We also included a respondent’s religion, region, and city size at age 16 as additional variables in the ﬁnal column
of Table 3 and all of Table 5. The inclusion or exclusion of these variables does not aﬀect our reported results.
8Table 1: Summary Statistics
FIRST NAME FEATURES (FNF)
VARIABLE MEAN STD MEDIAN MIN MAX NOBS
POPULARITY 0.61 0.37 0.76 0 1 5587
SYLLABLES 2.01 0.74 2.00 0 7 5587
SCRABBLE 9.95 3.78 10.00 1 29 5587
UNUSUAL-SP 0.06 0.24 0.00 0 1 5587
NICKNAME 0.15 0.36 0.00 0 1 5587
AH-END 0.18 0.39 0.00 0 1 5587
OH-END 0.01 0.11 0.00 0 1 5587
EE-END 0.20 0.40 0.00 0 1 5587
VOW-BEG 0.11 0.32 0.00 0 1 5587
CON-END 0.48 0.50 0.00 0 1 5587
BIND 0.14 0.16 0.09 0 1 5587
EXOGENOUS BACKGROUND FACTORS (EBF)
VARIABLE MEAN STD MEDIAN MIN MAX NOBS
BLACK 0.14 0.34 0.00 0 1 5587
OTHERRACE 0.05 0.22 0.00 0 1 5587
MALE 0.44 0.50 0.00 0 1 5587
YRBORN 51.60 17.62 54.00 5 84 5571
PAEDUC 11.18 4.12 12.00 0 20 4065
MAEDUC 11.25 3.48 12.00 0 20 4806
SIBS 3.67 3.06 3.00 0 35 5568
ABROAD 0.17 0.38 0.00 0 1 5587
AGE 46.13 17.21 43.00 18 89 5570
LIFETIME OUTCOMES (LO)
VARIABLE MEAN STD MEDIAN MIN MAX NOBS
FINRELA 2.89 0.86 3.00 1 5 4227
OCCPREST 43.50 13.66 42.00 17 86 5334
CLASS 2.47 0.65 2.00 1 4 5552
HAPPY 2.17 0.62 2.00 1 3 4261
CHB25 0.35 0.48 0.00 0 1 1704
EDUC 13.25 2.97 13.00 0 20 5570
Note: The sample statistics average(MEAN), standard deviation (STD), median (MEDIAN), minimum
(MIN) and maximum (MAX). NOBS is the number of observations. The data were taken from the 1994 and
2002 samples from the General Social Survey (GSS).
9The name variables are somewhat unusual and so deserve our initial attention. Table 1
reveals a number of interesting features about the data. First, the average popularity of names
in our sample is .61 with a median of .75, suggesting a lot of name clustering at the top of the
popularity index. Second, the linguistic features of names suggest that, on average, a name has 2
syllables, a scrabble score of 10, with about 6 percent having a non-standard or unusual spelling.
Moreover, about half of all names end in a constant and almost 80 percent start with a constant (1
minus the fraction that begin in a vowel). And of the names that end in a vowel sound, however,
they appear to be evenly split between ‘ee’ endings and ‘ah’ endings (each about 20 percent of
the sample), with ‘oh’ sounding name endings being relatively rare (about 1 percent of the time).
The average probability of having black name is estimated around 14 percent, suggesting that
our method of estimating that reproduces the sample probability of being black very accurately.
Finally, the median value for BIND is much lower, however, at about .09, consistent with skewed
distribution of BIND, where some names have very high values of BIND.
The remaining demographic data are somewhat standard. The respondent’s of parents have
an average level of 11 years of education, while respondents have approximately two more years
of formal education. Moreover, 17 percent of the sample was either born outside of the U.S. or
their parents were, and 35 percent of those over 25 had a child before they were 25. Also, on
average respondent’s report that they are between working class and middle class, and that they
are ‘somewhat happy’. Finally, the average respondent’s marker of their relative income status
when growing up is very similar to their average perceived ﬁnancial relative position, 2.8 out of a
scale of 1 to 5, with a standard deviation of .6. Finally, the average prestige occupation score is 43,
with a range between 17 and 86.
Table 2 provides the raw correlation between these key ﬁrst name features variables of
interest. Rather than remark on all the possible sets of correlations, we provide information of the
data relationships as they pertain to the relationships between First Name Features in addition
Exogenous Background Factors and Lifetime Outcomes. First, there is a signiﬁcant amount of
correlation between the First Name Features. For instance, names that have a higher popularity
score have typically higher scrabble scores, are less likely to end in with an ‘ah’ or ‘oh’ ending
10sound, and are less likely to be nicknames or start with a vowel. Additionally, ﬁrst names with
a higher score for the BIND is also signiﬁcantly correlated with ending with an ‘ah’ sound, not
ending with a consonant and having more syllables.17
Second, First Name Features and Exogenous Background Factors are frequently signiﬁcantly
correlated with one another. Indeed, most of the correlations reported in the rows labeled BLACK
through ABROAD are statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, POP is positively correlated with the
mother and father’s education levels. It is also negatively related to having more siblings and
not having both parents born in the U.S. The blackness index is also lower among men and it is
negatively related to parent’s education.18 Also, as has been noted by others, First Name Features
contain a great deal of gender and race information. Indeed, the correlation of First Name Features
with BLACK, MALE and OTHER are typically statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, First Name Features are not as signiﬁcantly correlated with Lifetime Outcomes
as they were with Exogenous Background Factors– that is, the correlations in the rows labelled
FINRELA through EDUC are less frequently signiﬁcant as those above. A notable exceptions is
that BIND is negatively correlated with FINRELA, OCCPREST, CLASS, HAPPY and EDUC, and
positively correlated with having a child before 25. Also, POPULARITY is positively correlated
with attaining more education and having a reduced likelihood of having a child before 25.
17First name features are also correlated across time within a family. Though not shown, the GSS data contained
also ﬁrst name information on the other household members. We used this information to form parent child pairs to
study intergenerational transmission of the ﬁrst name features considered here using intergenerational correlations or
contingency tables as indicators of intergenerational persistence. The analysis was performed for the whole sample,
for African American sub sample and for matched gender sub sample (where parent and child were of same gender).
The overall result of this analysis is that most ﬁrst name features are statistically signiﬁcantly correlated across
generations, but that this correlation is a moderate one. The only exception to this moderate correlation is the
correlation of the Blackness index across generations in the entire sample (and matched gender sub sample), where
the intergenerational correlation is approximately .20. However, the intergenerational correlation in the African
American sub sample is only .08, implying that the high correlation in the overall sample is driven by the presence
of the African American minority in that sample.
18Fryer and Levitt (2003) also ﬁnd a negative association between BIND and MALE.
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122.3 Estimation Results
While Tables 1 and 2 in sub-section 2.2 describe the empirical regularities of the data, in this
sub-section we adopt a more standard regression format for disentangling the potential role that
names signal about background and which can aﬀect an individual’s future. We begin by analyzing
the extent to which a respondent’s Exogenous Background Factors (EBF) can be predicted from
an individual’s ﬁrst name features. To do so, we estimate the following regression speciﬁcation:
EBFi = β0 + β1 · FNFi + i (1)
where EBFi is respondent i0s 9 exogenous background factors, and FNFi is respondent i0s 11 ﬁrst
name features described above.19 These regression results for expression (1) are presented in Table
3, and indicate the extent to which an outsider would be able to infer an individual’s exogenous
background characteristics just from the characteristics of an individual’s name.20,21
19We also ran the regressions in this analysis by including quadratic terms for the relevant ﬁrst name features as
well as allowing for asymmetric eﬀects by measuring these same variables as the absolute deviation from the median.
In general, these eﬀects were not signiﬁcant and so were excluded from the results reported below.
20Of course, the dependent variables in many of these regressions are discrete. However, rather than estimate
probit or ordered probit speciﬁcations, we provide estimates using the simple OLS estimator. To note, when one
estimates these empirical models using probit or ordered probit estimators, the results of the linear eﬀects are similar
to those presented in the following tables. Moreover, the pattern of statistical signiﬁcance is unaﬀected by using
this alternative estimation strategy. Hence, to keep matters simple we present the OLS estimates below though the
alternative estimates are available upon request.
21The standard errors were estimated allowing for clustering based on the individuals names that occur more than
twice and by assigning all unique names to the same cluster. This is easily justiﬁed as follows. The regression of
Yi on dummy variables for actual ﬁrst names (920 of them that occur twice in the full sample) , AFNi, allows for
an F-test on their joint signiﬁcance. However this type of test from the regression Yi = AFNi + ui does not reveal
much interesting information about the qualitative and common features of names other than provide a somewhat
interesting rank of names. However if AFNi is related to ﬁrst name features, FNFi with estimated error, ei, then
the regression of Yi = FNFi + ei + ui would involve an error, ei, that was distinct for each name. Accordingly, the
variance of this error may diﬀer across names, which suggests that we should allow for clustering along this dimension,
and we do so throughout the paper.
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14The results in Table 3 provide the very strong impression that one can infer a great deal
about a respondent’s background from their ﬁrst name. As such, this conﬁrms the results of the
simple correlations presented in Table 2. For instance, respondents who are Black, as reported in
the ﬁrst column of results, have less popular names, more syllables and higher Scrabble scores, fewer
‘oh’ endings, are more likely to end in a vowel, and have higher blackness index. This same pattern
also exists for those that are neither white nor black (i.e. either), except that they have more ‘ah’
endings and more ‘oh’ endings, not fewer ones. Also, as indicated in the bottom rows of the table,
in both of these equations the R2 is .04 and the p-value from an F-test that the coeﬃcients on First
Name Features are all equal to zero is well below .001. As well, even if BIND is excluded from
the F-test, the remaining First Name Features are jointly signiﬁcant at below the .001 level. The
remaining rows indicate a number of key features of the relationship between background factors
and ﬁrst names. First, names indicate a great deal of information on gender and the year when
one was born. In both of the regressions, the R2’s are relatively large (over .35 for Male).22 Also, a
respondent’s higher parental education background can be partially inferred from higher popularity,
fewer syllables, more standard spellings, more nicknames, fewer ‘oh’ endings, not starting with a
vowel, ending with a consonant and having a lower Blackness Index. This latter result, on BIND,
is actually quite large: moving from a purely non-black name to a fully black name is associated
with a Father having 2 fewer years of formal education and a Mother having 1 year less.
While it has been important to establish that ﬁrst names confer a great deal of information
about a person’s background, it is also essential to understand whether any linkages exist between
ﬁrst name features and an individual’s lifetime outcomes. As discussed above, the lifetime outcomes
we consider from the GSS data available are denoted LOi. To begin to unravel this connection, we
ﬁrst estimate the following speciﬁcation23
22The point we are making here, is that purely linguistic features (non-gender speciﬁc) of the names do convey
information about the gender. Naturally, most names are gender-speciﬁc and thus convey gender information.
23Again, while these lifetime outcomes are discrete, we estimate the parameters using OLS with clustered errors
for ease of presentation. The results are similar if we estimate the parameters using probit or ordered-probit.
15Table 4A: Respondent’s Lifetime Outcomes Regressed on First Name Features
FINRELA OCCPREST CLASS HAPPYIND CHILDBF25 EDUC
POPULARITY 0.062b 0.686 −0.006 0.008 −0.107c 0.393c
[0.031] [0.567] [0.021] [0.020] [0.034] [0.121]
SYLLABLES −0.001 −0.236 0.016 −0.020 0.033 −0.089
[0.022] [0.336] [0.016] [0.017] [0.024] [0.070]
SCRABBLE −0.005 0.022 −0.003 0.004a −0.008a −0.001
[0.003] [0.050] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.013]
AH-END −0.071 −1.476b −0.115c −0.027 0.010 −0.017
[0.048] [0.640] [0.035] [0.030] [0.060] [0.140]
OH-END 0.101 −3.100c −0.094 0.179b −0.025 −0.423
[0.111] [1.143] [0.088] [0.081] [0.113] [0.423]
EE-END 0.023 −1.177a −0.019 0.027 0.062 −0.119
[0.042] [0.627] [0.033] [0.031] [0.050] [0.141]
VOW-BEG −0.065a −0.277 −0.020 −0.036 −0.025 −0.328b
[0.038] [0.751] [0.030] [0.026] [0.036] [0.146]
CON-END 0.111c 0.362 −0.011 0.013 −0.039 0.188
[0.040] [0.504] [0.024] [0.025] [0.048] [0.122]
UNUSUAL-SP −0.029 0.675 −0.014 −0.018 −0.005 0.301a
[0.065] [0.748] [0.044] [0.030] [0.039] [0.167]
NICKNAME 0.072a −0.611 0.004 0.008 −0.084b 0.036
[0.040] [0.626] [0.029] [0.028] [0.035] [0.119]
BIND −0.218c −3.487c −0.258c −0.195c 0.251c −1.148c
[0.078] [1.168] [0.059] [0.060] [0.085] [0.259]
NOBS 4227 5334 5552 4261 1704 5570
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02
P: FNF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
P: FNF ex BIND 0.000 0.000 0.131 0.024 0.000 0.000
Note: See Table 3.
16LOi = β0 + β1 · FNFi + i (2)
where, again, FNFi represents the respondent’s ﬁrst name features described above.
Our estimation results of expression (2) are reported in Table 4A. There are a number
of key ﬁndings to the table. First, in all cases, the ﬁrst name variables are jointly statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Second, the R2’s are typically lower in these regressions as
compared to those in Table 3 where exogenous background characteristics were the dependent
variables. Third, more popular names are associated with better lifetime outcomes: that is, more
education, occupational prestige and income, and a reduced likelihood of having a child before
25. Moreover, names with higher values for BIND are associated with poorer lifetime outcomes:
that is, less education, occupational prestige, happiness, social class and income, and an increased
likelihood of having a child before 25. As well, ‘ah’ and ‘oh’ ending sounds in a name are also
related to poorer lifetime outcomes, though popularity is related to better lifetime outcomes.
As demonstrated in Table 4A, ﬁrst names just by themselves convey information about a
respondent’s lifetime outcomes. An important question that has come up in the literature, however,
is whether the link between ﬁrst names and lifetime outcomes survives the inclusion of additional
information such as labor market experience and/or education (e.g. the analysis of Bertrand &
Mullainathan). In other words, does your ﬁrst name features aﬀect one’s lifetime outcomes after
learning information that may be readily available in a job resume.24 We estimate, therefore, the
following equation and report the results in Table 4B.
LOi = β0 + β1 · FNFi + γ1LMEXi + γ2LMEX2
i + γ3EDUCi + i (3)
24Since employers are not suppose to discriminate based on age, and this information (like race) is unlikely to be
directly available on a resume, we use labor market experience instead. While it is also illegal to discriminate based
on gender, we include this since it is likely to be easily inferred from a resume. However, the results in Table 4B do
not depend on the inclusion of MALE as an explanatory variable.
17Table 4B: Respondent’s Lifetime Outcomes Regressed on
First Name Features and Resume Information
FINRELA OCCPREST CLASS HAPPY CHBF25
POPULARITY 0.026 0.760a 0.031 0.002 −0.045a
[0.029] [0.392] [0.023] [0.021] [0.026]
SYLLABLES 0.016 −0.212 0.014 −0.018 0.012
[0.020] [0.270] [0.014] [0.017] [0.019]
SCRABBLE −0.005a 0.044 −0.001 0.005a −0.005
[0.003] [0.042] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
AH-END −0.016 −0.892 −0.082b −0.012 −0.011
[0.044] [0.562] [0.036] [0.030] [0.052]
OH-END 0.083 −0.745 0.013 0.193b −0.026
[0.101] [1.419] [0.074] [0.088] [0.114]
EE-END 0.05 −0.794 −0.003 0.034 0.040
[0.039] [0.560] [0.028] [0.030] [0.042]
VOW-BEG −0.055 0.067 −0.026 −0.034 −0.036
[0.037] [0.605] [0.026] [0.026] [0.036]
CON-END 0.047 0.133 −0.006 −0.003 0.040
[0.046] [0.424] [0.024] [0.026] [0.039]
UNUSUAL-SP −0.033 0.652 −0.003 −0.02 0.022
[0.057] [0.513] [0.038] [0.029] [0.037]
NICKNAME 0.064a −0.039 0.044a 0.008 −0.060a
[0.038] [0.481] [0.025] [0.029] [0.031]
BIND −0.110 −0.727 −0.170c −0.163c 0.208b
[0.075] [0.994] [0.057] [0.061] [0.083]
MALE 0.155c −0.412 −0.030 0.037 −0.181c
[0.033] [0.372] [0.021] [0.023] [0.027]
LMEX 0.007c 0.162c 0.000 0.003 0.019c
[0.002] [0.033] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
LMEX2/100 −0.002 −0.091a 0.011c −0.001 −0.029c
[0.003] [0.049] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004]
EDUC 0.097c 2.558c 0.078c 0.025c −0.047c
[0.005] [0.070] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
NOBS 4211 5312 5530 4242 1701
R2 0.12 0.28 0.12 0.02 0.16
P: FNF 0.072 0.027 0.002 0.02 0.018
P: FNF ex BIND 0.204 0.045 0.083 0.199 0.212
R2† 0.13 0.28 0.13 0.03 0.16
P : FNF† 0.503 0.158 0.208 0.147 0.188
P : BIND† 0.522 0.817 0.024 0.074 0.034
P : POP† 0.912 0.152 0.721 0.298 0.103
Note: See Table 3. The † indicates that the R-squared’s and p-values refer to a regression (not
shown) where BLACK and OTHERRACE were included as right hand side regressors.
18There are three key ﬁndings in Table 4B. First, POPULARITY remains a signiﬁcant ex-
planatory variable in the CHB25 regressions, and it is no longer signiﬁcant in the FINRELA
response though it is now positively related to the OCCPREST response. Based on the statistical
signiﬁcance of education and labor market experience in these equations, it can be inferred that
popularity is working through education in the ﬁnancial relative income response. Second, BIND
is statistically signiﬁcant again in the CLASS, HAPPY and EDUC regressions. Higher values for
BIND lead to a lower assessment of social class, happiness and an increased chance of having chil-
dren before 25. However, as with POPULARITY, BIND is now no longer statistically signiﬁcant in
the income responses. Again, the role of education and labor market experience is clearly soaking
up the role that POPULARITY and BIND played in the income response regressions in Table 4A.
Third, the First Name Features are jointly statistically diﬀerent from zero at or below the .1 level
for all the lifetime outcomes. It would thus seem that ﬁrst names retain a strong role overall in
determining lifetime outcomes even after controlling for a respondent’s labor market experience.
In addition, the bottom panel of Table 4B includes additional information about the sen-
sitivity of these ﬁndings to whether race variables BLACK and OTHERRACE are includes as
additional explanatory variables to equation (3). These variables might be important to an inter-
view, where a candidate’s race may be easily communicated by sight.25 The bottom panel reports
the R2’s and p-value tests for the inclusion of the FNF variables as well as POPULARITY and
BIND by themselves for these speciﬁcations (not shown). Interestingly, including these race vari-
ables only marginally aﬀect the R2’s by less than .01. Second, and perhaps more importantly, BIND
is statistically signiﬁcant at below the .1 level for both the CLASS and CHB25 regressions, though
collectively the FNF variables are no longer statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, POPULARITY is not
signiﬁcant when race variables are included, with the exception of the CHB25 regression.
Of course, education and labor market experience (with the exception of the age component)
are endogenous and are well known to aﬀect the lifetime outcomes we consider. To explore the
extent to which only purely exogenous components of an individuals life, that is their ﬁrst name
features (FNF) and exogenous background factors (EBF), we estimate the following regression:
25Of course, other characteristics may be communicated by sight that may aﬀect a candidate’s chances for receiving
an oﬀer: namely, obesity or height.
19LOi = β0 + β1 · FNFi + β2EBFi + i (4)
The estimation results of equation (4) are provided in Table 5.26 The importance of these
regressions is to identify the pure eﬀects of name features on an individual’s lifetime outcomes, since
presumably their names could be indirectly aﬀecting the results in Table 4B as ﬁrst name features
could be aﬀecting education and labor market experience. The table has two main components:
the ﬁrst 6 columns of the table allow for the standard eﬀects of a ﬁrst name’s popularity and the
black names index, whereas the last 6 columns allow for interactive eﬀects between these ﬁrst name
features and the respondent’s actual race.
There are three key ﬁndings contained in the ﬁrst set of results in columns 1 through 6.
First, POPULARITY is still a signiﬁcant predictor of having a higher social class and not having a
child before 25. Second, BIND is still a signiﬁcant predictor of lower social class, lower happiness,
reduced education and an increased likelihood of having a child before 25. In words, moving from
a name that no blacks have to one that only blacks have is associated with .6 years fewer of
education. Importantly, these ﬁndings hold even though RACE and the full gamut of external
background factors, particularly parents education, are included as explanatory variables. Third,
First Name Features excluding BIND are jointly signiﬁcant at below the .05 level in the social class
and happiness regressions.
To put these ﬁndings in a broader context, we can think of our six lifetime outcome variables
as reﬂecting three types of phenomena: ﬁrst, FINRELA and PRESTIGE are indicators of actual and
future ﬁnancial outcomes; Second, CHB25 and EDUC are lifetime outcomes that are intermediate
economic outcomes in the sense that while they would not enter directly into an individual’s utility
function, they would deﬁnitely impact on an individual’s utility. Moreover, these two variables are
variables that are likely to be correlated with an individual’s labor market productivity. Third,
social class and happiness are quasi-economic indicators of both socio-economic standing as well
26We also included a respondent’s religion, region, and city size at age 16 as additional variables in all the columns
of Table 5. The inclusion or exclusion of these variables does not aﬀect our reported results.
20as reﬂect a level of lifetime enjoyment that is related to economic utility.27 There is the further
possibility that these quasi economic outcomes may also be correlated with labor productivity:
simply unhappy workers and those that feel that they are lower class (or even upper class) may
have diﬀerential labor productivities. Based on the ﬁndings in columns 1 through 6 of Table 5,
controlling for a myriad of exogenous family background characteristics, a ﬁrst name’s popularity
and/or ‘blackness’ appear to have an impact on intermediate economic outcomes that are likely
correlated with labor productivity but not on actual economic outcomes. It would thus appear
that our ﬁnding support Fryer and Levitt’s (2003) reconciliation of their ﬁndings with those of
Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2003) ﬁndings of apparent resume discrimination. Namely, that the
‘blackness’ of a name is correlated with factors that can aﬀect labor productivity which could in
turn be reﬂected in discrimination at the resume level. As we demonstrate, however, this potential
channel of discrimination does not have an impact on pure economic outcomes in our sample.
The remaining part of Table 5, however, further investigate these ﬁndings. Namely, we
re-estimated speciﬁcation (4) and allow for interactive eﬀects between BLACK and OTHERRACE
with POPULARITY and BIND.28 In particular, we are interested in whether the impact of a pop-
ular or black sounding name on an individual’s lifetime outcomes diﬀers depending upon whether
one is black or not. In particular, one would be more inclined to conclude that there was evidence
in favor of discrimination based on the blackness of a name if the eﬀect of the variable on income
were stronger for black respondents. In contrast, one would be more inclined to believe that iden-
tity were an important component of an individual’s name if, for example, non-black individuals
had worse lifetime outcomes if their names registered high on the blackness index. In other words,
blacks may face outside costs and inside beneﬁts to having a ‘blacker name’, though a non-black
would only realize the former.
27For a more comprehensive treatment of the happiness literature, see, among others, Blanchﬂower and Oswald
(2004) and Frey and Stutzer (2002).
28In Table 6 below we also examine the eﬀects of gender.
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23Columns 7 through 12 of Table 5 report a number of ﬁndings that indicate that the relation-
ship between the race content of a name may not be straightforward. There are three main ﬁndings
in these columns of the table. First, in column 7, the estimate coeﬃcient on BLACK ×POP and
BIND × OTHERRACE are both negative and statistically signiﬁcant. That is, black respon-
dents with more popular names, not more black ones, tend to report lower ﬁnancial status, as do
non-black and non-whites with ‘blacker’ names. For example, a non-black non-white with a name
that is deemed fully black reports almost a .8 lower ﬁnancial status as compared to a non-black
non-white with a name devoid of blackness. Such ﬁndings are consistent with the identity view that
blacker names provide net beneﬁts to blacks, though not to others. Further evidence in support of
this is in column 8 where occupational prestige is the left hand side variable. Again, the coeﬃcient
on the term BLACK × POP is statistically signiﬁcant and negative. Moreover, the coeﬃcient
on BLACK × BIND is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Together, these two sets of ﬁndings
indicate that blacker names by black are associated with more prestigious occupations, but not for
blacks with more conformist ﬁrst names or non-white non-blacks with ‘blacker’ names. Second, the
results in columns 8, 9, 11 and 12 indicate that the basic results for CLASS, CHB25 and EDUC are
unaﬀected by the interaction terms – see F-statistics and/or coeﬃcients on BIND or POP. Third,
the negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on BIND×OTHERRACE indicates that the
results on BIND and HAPPY in column 4 are actually concentrated among non-black non-whites.
Just as the impact of ﬁrst names features on an individual’s lifetime outcomes can be
diﬀerentiated based on race, the results in Table 6 investigate the extent to which gender also has
a role to play. In particular, we separately re-estimated for males and females the speciﬁcation of
(4) that also includes interactive eﬀects between race and POPULARITY and BIND. Columns 1
through 6 report the results for MALES, while the results for FEMALES are reported in columns
7 through 12. These results can be contrasted with the full sample results presented in Table 5 to
help understand the separate and interactive roles that race and gender play in the transmission of
ﬁrst name features to lifetime outcomes.
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26There are two key ﬁndings presented in Table 6. First, for males only, the eﬀect of a higher
BIND index for BLACK’s on their ﬁnancial relative position is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
– a movement from a non-black name to a fully black name reduces a males social standing by
.6, which is slightly less than one standard deviation as reported in Table 1. In contrast, for
females only, the eﬀect of a higher POPULARITY index for BLACK’s on their ﬁnancial relative
position is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. However, for both males and females, the impact
of a higher BIND index for OTHERRACE (i.e non-blacks non-whites) on their ﬁnancial relative
position is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. In other words, black males with blacker names
have lower ﬁnancial relative status, as do non-black non-whites regardless of gender. In contrast,
black women have lower ﬁnancial status if they have more popular names. Given the amount of
background factors controlled for, it would seem unlikely that these results can be explained away
by unobserved labor productivity.
Second, the impact of names appears to have a much stronger eﬀect on women as compared
to men.29 For example, for all the lifetime outcomes listed in columns (7) through (12), the p-values
at the bottom of Table 6 indicate that either the BIND variables (P:BIND) is below .1 or the ﬁrst
names features exclusive of POPULARITY and BIND (P:FNF ex POP and BIND) is below .1, or
both are. In stark contrast, the p-values for MALES are typically a great deal higher than this
cut-oﬀ. This fact that ﬁrst names appear to have a greater impact on female’s lifetime outcomes,
even after controlling for a myriad of background characteristics, can be further seen in the rows
for the impact of BIND and its interaction terms on lifetime outcomes. For females only, BIND
is negatively and signiﬁcantly related to EDUC, HAPPY and positively associated with CHBF25.
Thus, there seems to be broader evidence of a link between ﬁrst names and ﬁnancial outcomes for
women than for men.30
Taken together, two clear ﬁndings emerge from Tables 5 and 6. First, in many instances,
there is consistent evidence that the blackness of a name is related to factors that are related
29Interestingly, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) report a similar ratio male-to-female callback rates for respon-
dents with African American names and those with white names.
30This diﬀerence between statistical signiﬁcance of name features by gender does not seem to be driven by diﬀerences
in the overall ﬁt of the model or by the diﬀerences in sample sizes across genders, since these two variables remain
roughly comparable across genders in diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
27to labor productivity – education, happiness and early fertility. This ﬁnding is consistent with
Fryer and Levitt (2003). Second, there are also two pieces of partial evidence that discrimination
also plays a role in the impact of ﬁrst names a view consistent with Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2003). For example, black males with blacker names report lower ﬁnancial status even though
they do not, ceteris paribus, have signiﬁcantly lower education, for example. Second, the fact that
non-white non-blacks with blacker names have lower ﬁnancial standing (both males and females)
suggests an implicit discrimination cost from having blacker names that for these individuals in
not accompanied by whatever beneﬁts result from having a black identity. Further support for this
identity based role for discrimination is found in that Black Females with more popular (i.e. whiter
) names report higher class but also lower ﬁnancial status.
3 Interpretations and Conclusion
Our research on the economic impact of ﬁrst names demonstrates three ﬁndings. First, the features
of an individual’s name reveal a great deal of information their background, even the part of their
background that they inherited at birth. Second, the features of an individual’s name have a great
deal of predictive power about their lifetime outcomes such as income and social status, educational
attainment, whether they have a child before 25, etc ... Third, in a great many instances these ﬁrst
names also continue to have predictive power for an individual’s lifetime outcomes even when one
controls for their exogenous background factors. Indeed, two dimensions that emerge as important
determinants of the linkage between ﬁrst names and lifetime outcomes are race and gender.
Ultimately, there are two potential explanations for the transmission mechanism which
links names and lifetime outcomes: namely, either individuals face discrimination or preference
based on their ﬁrst names, or ﬁrst names are correlated with factors that aﬀect an individual’s
labor productivity. The former explanation has been favored by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)
while the latter has been favored by Fryer and Levitt (2003). Certainly our data provides evidence
of the latter. We demonstrate that gender and race based components of names are independent
determinants of less happy individuals, who are less educated, and who have children before 25.
28These outcomes are likely related to workers that are less productive, ceteris paribus. However,
these factors do not generally aﬀect income, though they aﬀect the respondent’s perceived social
standing.
Nevertheless, while we do ﬁnd evidence of the link between the race and gender qualities of
a ﬁrst name and factors that are related to labor productivity, we believe that our study does reveal
some indirect evidence of discrimination. In particular, our ﬁndings that the blackness of a name
and the popularity of a name have diﬀerential impacts based on the respondent’s race and gender
indicates that names can have an impact on lifetime ﬁnancial outcomes that is disproportionate
to their relationships to fundamentals. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁnding that black males with blacker
names have lower ﬁnancial relative position reﬂects potential straightforward discrimination that
reduces these individuals opportunities, subject to the caveat that we have controlled for a suﬃcient
amount of background factors. In addition, the ﬁnding that non-black non-whites demonstrate
lower ﬁnancial relative status potentially demonstrates a more subtle form of discrimination based
on identity. Namely, while blacks may face costs and beneﬁts from a blacker name that correspond
to the groups they do and don’t identify with, non-black non-whites with blacker names would only
realize the former and not the latter.
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30Data Appendix: Variables Used in the Analysis
Key Variables of Interest
FINRELA The respondent’s household ﬁnancial income relative to others. It is measured on a
self reported scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being that your ﬁnancial status is well below the mean,
and 5 being that it is far above the mean.
EDUC Number of years of education.
CLASS The respondent’s social class relative to others. It is measured on a self reported scale
of 1 to 4, with 1 being lower class, 2 being working class, 3 being middle class and 4 being
upper class. being upper class.
POPULARITY Variable running from 0.000 to 1. Has value of one minus the respondent’s
name rank in gender speciﬁc Social Security Administrations’ ‘Top 1,000 popularity list for
the birth decade of the individual divided by 1000. Has value 0 if the name does not appear
on the list. Positive regression coeﬃcient then means that Y decreases with popularity.
BIND Blackness index. Probability of being black conditional on having the name in our sample,
excluding the own individual’s observation. Calculated in this manner only for names that
have at least two occurrences in the sample. For unique names, the BIND is set equal to the
probability that the respondent is black, conditional on having a unique name.
SYLLABLES The number of syllables in a name. Coded by following the standard rules of
syllablication. See http://english.glendale.cc.ca.us/syllables.html.
SCRABBLE A measure of linguistic complexity, measured by the simple word score the name
would receive from the popular board game SCRABBLE.
UNUSUAL-SP A dummy variable equal to one if the name is spelled unusually, and zero other-
wise. A name was determined to be unusually spelled if multiple spellings were pronounced
the same way (e.g. Jeﬀrey and Geoﬀrey), the more popular name appeared at least four
times, and the less popular spelling occurred half or fewer times as the most popular spelling.
NICKNAME A dummy variable equal to one if the name is denoted a nickname in Wallace
(1992), and zero otherwise.
AH-END A dummy variable equal to one if the name ends with an ‘ah’ sound (e.g. Mariah), and
zero otherwise.
0H-END A dummy variable equal to one if the name ends with an ‘o’ sound (e.g. Mario), and
zero otherwise.
EE-END A dummy variable equal to one if the name ends with an ‘ee’ sound (e.g. Brittany),
and zero otherwise.
VOW-BEG A dummy variable equal to one if the name begins with a vowel (e.g. Abigail), and
zero otherwise.
31CON-END A dummy variable equal to one if the name ends with a consonant
BIND The probability that a person with a given name is black.
OCCPREST The respondent’s occupational prestige score based on 1980 occupational classiﬁ-
cations and income data.
CHBF25 For men and women over 25, a dummy variable equal to 1 if they report having a child
before 25, and zero otherwise. This question is not asked in all years.
HAPPY An index of happiness that is 1 if you are ‘not too happy’, 2 if you are ‘pretty happy’
and 3 if you are ‘very happy’.
Additional Control Variables
AGE Age of Respondent.
BLACK Dummy variable 1 if race is black, and 0 otherwise.
ABROAD Dummy variable 1 if respondent or either of his or her parents was not born in the
U.S., and 0 otherwise.
MALES Dummy variable 1 if male, and 0 if female.
LMEX Labor market experience, equal to AGE − EDUC − 5.
YRBORN The year in which the respondent was born.
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